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The Difficult Development of Parliamentary Politics in the Gulf:  
Parliaments and the Process of Managed Reform in Kuwait, Bahrain 
and Oman 
GREG POWER 
Abstract 
Parliaments have a poor record in the Middle East, often providing a vehicle to enhance 
the ruling authorities’ control rather than democratic representation. However, since 
2011 the demands for political voice in post-revolutionary states have tended to focus on 
the creation of mass political parties and an effective, and democratic, parliament. This 
paper examines the development of the parliamentary institutions in three Gulf states: 
Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman. In each of these countries these institutions have, to some 
extent, been a forum for the articulation of demands for more political and constitutional 
power, but have often been prevented from addressing sensitive political issues, and 
their powers and membership have been manipulated to the benefit of the government. 
The paper examines how these dynamics have played themselves out in each of the three 
Gulf states, and reflects on the role that parliamentary institutions might play in the 
coming years in both managing those states’ political tensions and providing a catalyst 
for more far-reaching political reform. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The speed of change in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since the beginning of 
2011 has made analysis of political institutions within the region difficult and prediction even 
harder. ‘Arab Spring’ is being used as an all-encompassing term, but masks huge variety 
within the region in terms of the speed and size of the initial protest movements, and 
countries’ adaption to post-uprising politics. The contrasting trajectories of Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya and Syria emphasizes just some of that variety. Within the Gulf, most media attention 
has focused on Bahrain, where protests were met with forceful suppression by the ruling 
family, and where few are offering an optimistic assessment of the prospects for change. Yet 
there have been protests in many countries with rulers in all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
states nervous enough about regional trends to co-ordinate their responses to the pressures for 
change. 
 
 
I am very grateful to Sameer Kassam and Faten Hussein for their research and ideas, and their very helpful 
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 The demands for reform are a reflection of long-standing tensions and deeper trends 
within such societies. The way in which they have emerged – and been dealt with 
subsequently – highlight characteristics in a process of ‘managed reform’ within the region. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine some of those developments and dynamics , focusing 
principally on the role of the parliamentary institution in Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman.1 
Parliaments are the most prominent institutions of representative democracy – with 190 of 193 
countries around the world having some sort of representative body (UNDP/IPU 2012: 10) – 
and the fight for democracy in the Arab region has highlighted the centrality of such 
institutions. The demands for political representation in post-revolutionary states have focused 
on the creation of mass political parties and an effective, and democratic, parliament.  
 The role of the parliaments in that process, and the extent to which they provide a 
forum for articulation of public demands for change, are less clear. The three countries studied 
here have perhaps the most active parliaments in the Gulf, but each highlights the 
distinctiveness of the processes of political change. In each country, the parliament has been 
both a symbol of, and a forum for, the pressure for democratic reform. At one end, Kuwait’s 
parliament is the loudest and liveliest in the region, having sat since 1963 (albeit with 
unconstitutional dissolutions in 1976 and 1986), and in recent years has increasingly 
challenged the emir and the government. In Bahrain, a short-lived parliament existed for 
around two years in the mid-1970s, and was resuscitated by the new king in 2002 partly as a 
means to ease sectarian tension. However, the fact that the new parliament turned out to be a 
pale imitation of its predecessor has been a source of continuing grievance around which 
much recent political turmoil has revolved. By contrast, the evolution of Oman’s parliament 
has been slow, even by the standards of the Gulf. The country, which was the latest in the 
GCC to adopt a constitution (in 1996), held its first popular elections in 2003, but to a body 
which lacked legislative authority, and whose influence was confined almost entirely to 
economic development. Yet the response of the sultan to popular unrest in Oman has led to 
that body’s being granted nominally important legislative powers; only time will tell what 
impact they will have. 
 Three themes underpin the analysis of the states’ political trajectory and dynamics of 
change. First, recent events have reinforced the extent to which the process of reform is 
controlled and directed by the ruling autocracy. Daniel Brumberg has characterized the states 
                                                          
1
 The terms ‘parliament’ or ‘parliamentary institution’ are used as generic terms throughout to cover the range of 
national representative, legislative and consultative bodies that exist within the region. A distinction is made 
between the Majlis A’Shura and Majlis Al-Nuwab/Al-Umma later in the paper. 
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as ‘liberalising autocracies’ distinguished by ‘guided pluralism, controlled elections and 
selective repression’ (Brumberg 2002: 56). Liberalizing autocracies are thus ‘liberal in the 
sense that their leaders not only tolerate but promote a measure of political openness … but 
they are autocratic in that their rulers always retain the upper hand … with their ultimate 
reliance on the supreme authority of the monarch or president, liberalized autocracies provide 
a kind of virtual democracy’ (Brumberg 2003: 3) 
 Recent political unrest has highlighted the challenges and difficulties in this process of 
‘managed reform’, not least the ‘King’s Dilemma’ (Huntington 1968: 177–91), that is, how 
ruling monarchs foster a process of political reform without endangering their own power, 
when reforms initiated from the top tend to increase demands for more radical change from 
the bottom. The dilemma they are grappling with ‘is how to balance undertaking reform that 
increases their own legitimacy against allowing the pendulum of power to swing … which 
could ultimately see a tangible challenge to their position’ (Ehteshami and Wright 2007: 916). 
In each of the three states, parliaments have been part of that process of managed reform: the 
institution providing the possibility of meaningful reform and an arena for the articulation of 
public concern, but also a forum within which political demands can be actively managed and 
manipulated by rulers.  
 Second, the relationship between voters and rulers – and thus the role of the 
parliaments – is conditioned by the nature of the rentier state in the Gulf. The quadrupling of 
oil prices during the 1970s changed the dynamic in these countries, bringing huge wealth, but 
meaning that the economy is ultimately dependent on the expenditure of the state, as the 
principal recipient of oil rents. This has several implications for politics. In the first place, it 
weakens demands for political representation – where the state does not need to rely on the 
income of citizens or the private sector for its tax revenues, it will feel less of an obligation to 
give them influence over policy or spending decisions. In short, ‘no taxation, no 
representation’. In addition, the middle classes, who would be expected to articulate these 
demands most forcefully, were effectively bought off in most of the Gulf countries. The 
merchant classes traded political power for economic wealth, or as John Waterbury puts it, 
‘the tacit understanding has been that the bourgeoisie would renounce any overt political role 
and that it would follow the broad economic directives of the state, in exchange for which it 
would be allowed to make significant profits’ (Waterbury 1994: 27). This context inevitably 
means that the sources of authority and legitimacy for elected representatives are different, 
which in turn is partly responsible for constraining the political role of parliamentary 
institutions within such states.  
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 Third, the political dynamics in the Gulf are changing, partly due to the events of 2011. 
But those events were themselves a reflection of deeper societal, demographic and economic 
pressures. The response to unrest in Oman and Kuwait by their rulers was to buy off some 
dissent, through either handouts, the creation of new jobs or various state-provided benefits. 
Yet the rulers themselves recognize that the rentier model is not a viable long-term strategy – 
as oil production declines, the state will not always be able to furnish its citizens with the same 
level of benefits. This in turn will undermine the social compact on which the current political 
settlement between the state, the private sector and its citizens is built.  
 The decline of natural resources is exacerbated by the Gulf’s rapid population growth, 
meaning that the burden on the state to provide education, welfare and employment is steadily 
expanding. The Arab Human Development Report of the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) in 2009 suggested that the Arab region as a whole needed to create 
around 50 million new jobs by 2020 to absorb its young population into the workforce. The 
high expectations of a rising young population create the conditions for political pressure, 
which the states need to anticipate. As Jill Crystal has pointed out, economic liberalization is 
being driven by ‘governments’ fear that growing youth unemployment will metastasise into 
political dissent if jobs are not found, and by the hope that the private sector can postpone that 
day’ (Crystal 2009: 43)  
 In any state, the parliament should be the principal vehicle for political representation, 
capable of speaking truth to power. In Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman the parliaments have all, to 
some extent, been a forum for the articulation of demands for more political and constitutional 
power. But the institutions suffer from a lack of public trust, and their role has been 
compromised by what is perceived as complicity with the ruling authorities. The parliaments 
have often been prevented from addressing some of the most sensitive political issues, and 
their powers and membership have been manipulated to the benefit of the government. They 
have thus been central to the strategy of managed reform, and the ruling authorities have 
sought to prevent them becoming effective or central to political life. But the behaviour of 
MPs has also often reinforced the sense that they are marginal to the political process. This 
paper examines how these dynamics have played themselves out in each of these three Gulf 
states, and reflects on the role that they might play in the coming years in both managing those 
states’ political tensions and providing a catalyst for more far-reaching political reform. 
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2. KUWAIT 
Kuwait’s parliament, the Majlis Al-Umma, created after independence in 1963, is the longest-
standing and the most vociferous in the region. Over the last fifty years, it has been the scene 
of successive challenges to the king’s powers and the push to extend the rights of the elected 
assembly. And, although it is arguably more significant than any other parliament in the Gulf, 
it has also been subject to the divide-and-rule tactics of the rulers, which have at times limited 
both its impact and its relevance, and frequently resulted in constitutional stalemate.  
 The parliament’s powers reflect a wider constitutional desire for checks and balances. 
In the first place, although fifty representatives are directly elected, the emir can appoint an 
additional fifteen members who sit in parliament as ministers, giving the government an 
immediate fifteen-person advantage. Parliament has significant powers, but they are 
essentially negative ones: it has the power to block, but little power to create. For example, the 
emir nominates ministers to cabinet, but parliament has the power to remove ministers 
(including the prime minister) and delay government legislation. It cannot appoint ministers or 
initiate laws. If parliament wins a vote of no confidence in the prime minister, the emir then 
either has to appoint an alternative whom parliament can work with or dissolve parliament and 
hold fresh elections. The distribution of power between the emir and the parliament in the 
constitution effectively means that each side can cancel the other out.  
 It is in this context that the ruling Al-Sabah family’s style of ‘managed reform’ needs 
to be understood. Since 1963 the political system has been characterized by exactly these sorts 
of tussles, with the advantage see-sawing between the two, as parliament and the ruling family 
have both sought to establish the boundaries of the other side’s power. On two occasions, in 
1976 and 1986, these tensions reached the point where the ruling Al-Sabah family suspended 
the constitution and dissolved parliament. That shifting of power has been especially contested 
since 2006, as the parliament’s push for greater influence and the government’s resistance 
meant four elections in six years. Unsurprisingly, voter disillusion was already high by the 
time of the protests across the Middle East in 2011. Yet the storming of parliament by 
protestors in November 2011 had less to do with issues seizing the region than with public and 
media outrage at a very local issue of alleged corruption, and the buying of MPs’ votes by the 
government. Whether the parliament can win itself significant new powers, and break out of 
the cycle of conflict, dissolution and government manipulation, is likely to rest less on events 
elsewhere than on how the parliament itself handles the recent corruption scandals, and 
whether it can convince the Kuwaiti public that it is central to political life. 
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2.1. Managed reform as ‘divide and rule’ 
The Al-Sabah family has run Kuwaiti politics since the eighteenth century, principally because 
it was at the head of an alliance with the trading merchants who dominated the economy 
before the discovery of oil. The shift to the rentier state also restructured political life. During 
the 1950s and 1960s the merchant families effectively gave up their right to influence policy 
in return for substantial government disbursements, and a tacit promise that the Al-Sabah 
would not interfere in business (Crystal 1989: 431). This then left the ruling family to adopt a 
strategy of divide and rule for the second half of the twentieth century. At various points, in 
order to dilute what they regarded as potential opposition in parliament the Al-Sabah quietly 
encouraged other groups, including Sunni Islamists, Bedouin and Shia groups to organize and 
become politically active. In addition, the family sought to buy the support of certain 
politicians, generally known as ‘service deputies’, whose support for government policy is 
given in return for the state funding for their constituencies. And, when that was not enough 
the electorate was expanded to include new groups of voters, such as newly urbanized 
Bedouin (Brown 2009).  
 This fracturing of the political system is reinforced by the absence of political parties. 
As in other Gulf states, political parties are banned by law and thus candidates cannot 
campaign on a party slate during elections. This does not stop blocs of like-minded candidates 
cooperating, and they have done so since the 1960s. But once elected, parliamentary groups 
form around fairly obvious political divisions, forming de facto political parties, which since 
1992 have broadly formed into four groups: a Sunni Islamist bloc, a Shia Islamist bloc, secular 
liberals, and ‘independents’ who generally support the government. However, the ban on 
parties means that voters elect individuals, giving an impetus to independent, local and tribal 
candidates, and these blocs tend to lack the level of party discipline and cohesion that 
characterizes parties in longer-standing political systems. 
 While the Al-Sabah’s style of ‘managed reform’ succeeded in fragmenting the 
opposition for long periods, it also increased the number of opposition groups represented in 
parliament, and could not prevent the growth in their support. Significantly, the Islamist 
groups gained representation for the first time in 1992, and have featured prominently ever 
since. Overall, opposition groups polled strongly in elections in 1992 and 1996, and formed 
the majority of MPs in the parliaments elected in 1999 and 2003. Yet their effectiveness as an 
opposition to government has been sporadic. They have tested government ministers and 
blocked government measures, but the level of fragmentation within the parliament means that 
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they have rarely worked in a concerted fashion. Opposition seems to rely on guerrilla raids on 
government measures, rather than presenting a coherent alternative to government policy.  
2.2. From crisis to uneasy settlement: 2006–11 
The Al-Sabah’s strategy for managing the parliament thus seemed to be working, albeit in an 
ad hoc fashion, up to 2006: by picking off individual politicians, on an issue-by-issue basis, it 
was relatively successful in diverting a sustained challenge to its power. However, that very 
policy appeared to have sown the seeds of the instability and the threat of a further 
constitutional crisis between 2006 and 2009. 
 The year 2006 appeared to mark a distinct shift in the relationship between parliament 
and government. Three events worked to galvanize the opposition into more unified political 
blocs. First, the death of Emir Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmad Al-Sabah prompted a crisis of 
succession, and emphasized the constitutional role of parliament in deposing a ruling emir 
deemed medically unfit to rule. Second, government proposals to change electoral law were 
perceived by the majority of MPs as an attempt to gerrymander constituencies and increase the 
likelihood of vote-buying. Third, parliament’s attempt to call the prime minister for 
questioning was resisted and led to the emir’s dissolving parliament and calling new elections 
for June 2006. In the resulting vote, the opposition won convincingly, taking more than two-
thirds of the seats in parliament, around half of them won by Islamists.  
  The immediate effect was the government’s acceptance of the new electoral law, but it 
marked the start of three years of political instability in Kuwait. In the spring of 2007 two 
members of the ruling family resigned following parliamentary interpellations, and in 2008 the 
differences between government and opposition became insurmountable as the parliament 
attempted to implement pay rises for state employees. The emir again dissolved parliament 
and elections were held in May 2008, where the opposition groups increased their 
representation to thirty-six seats in the fifty-member assembly. Tensions rose once more at the 
end of 2008 when the parliament again attempted to interpellate the prime minister, and they 
continued to increase until March 2009, when the cabinet resigned and the emir again 
dissolved parliament.  
 The subsequent elections in May 2009 were notable for three things: the relatively low 
turnout, at 55 per cent; the election of four women MPs for the first time; and a significant 
increase in government-supporting MPs, mainly at the expense of the Sunni Islamists. 
However, the political stalemate seemed set to continue. By the end of 2009, when parliament 
again attempted to interpellate the prime minister and three other ministers, there was 
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widespread fear that the emir would resort to the unconstitutional dissolution of parliament, as 
had occurred in 1976 and 1986.  
 In the event, what had been seen as another potential fracture in Kuwaiti political 
history was resolved in a relatively low-key fashion. All four ministers were not only 
questioned in parliament, but won votes of confidence. Superficially, at least, the period of 
instability appeared to have dissipated, with parliament and government coming to an uneasy 
settlement. Parliament had won the significant (and long-sought) constitutional right to 
question the prime minister, while the subsequent votes of approval for the ministers 
suggested a willingness on the part of parliament to compromise. In fact, this period was 
short-lived and by 2011 Kuwait seemed to be heading back towards the familiar cycle of 
parliamentary obstruction, ministerial resistance, government resignation and looming 
constitutional crisis.  
 The questioning of the prime minister and the subsequent events need to be understood 
in crude political terms, which underline the relative weakness of parliament in relation to 
government. Although the parliament had undoubtedly won an important constitutional 
principle in questioning the prime minister, in practice, this does not appear to have made the 
institution more powerful or influential. In the first place, as Kuwaiti politicians and 
commentators acknowledge, the point at which the government acceded to the interpellations 
was only when they knew they had enough support in parliament to win the votes of 
confidence. The minister for housing and development, Ahmed al-Fahad, was widely 
acknowledged as the key political figure in putting together a makeshift coalition of politicians 
to ensure that the prime minister and other ministers would survive. It again reflected the Al-
Sabah’s traditional strategy of dividing and manipulating any opposition – having secured 
this, the government could safely accept the principle, but not risk its authority over 
parliament, at least in the short term.  
 Such developments were a cause of dismay for many in parliament, not simply 
because the interpellation mechanism suddenly looked far less effective, but also because of 
the way in which the tool was being used by politicians. Although the number of 
interpellations increased during 2010, they were being used in what one MP described as an 
increasingly ‘frivolous’ fashion. In one instance, a female opposition politician described her 
frustration to the author because an interpellation was so badly worded, and the case against 
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the minister so poorly constructed, that she felt she had no option but to support the minister – 
even though there were strong reasons for withdrawing parliamentary approval.2 
2.3. Parliament and popular protest: 2011–12 
By 2011, when much of the Arab region was facing upheaval, the Kuwaiti parliament had 
long been the key institution in terms of the country’s political development, with the most 
significant debates revolving around the constitutional rights of the institution against those of 
the ruling authorities. Although the dynamic in Kuwait noticeably shifted in 2011, this was 
partly the result of events in neighbouring countries; but it also reflected a continuation of 
issues that went to the heart of the Al-Sabah’s style of managed reform.  
 At the start of the year, there were limited protests in parts of Kuwait City, motivated 
either by calls for the resignation of the prime minister, Sheikh Nasser Al-Mohammed Al-
Sabah, or focusing on the citizenship rights of the Bidoon within Kuwait.3 Parliament’s role 
was marginal in such events, and they dissipated quickly, especially after the government 
provided additional food subsidies and direct grants of 1,000 Kuwaiti dinar to every citizen. 
But by March, an unusual combination of events meant that the government was facing three 
different sets of interpellations, from different groups within the parliament. The most 
significant was over the interpretation of Kuwait’s role in Bahrain, with the Salafist bloc 
strongly criticizing the foreign minister and prime minister for not sending troops to Bahrain 
and failing to respond adequately to criticism of Kuwait in the Bahraini media. Although the 
Shia bloc took a different view of Bahrain, they also interpellated the prime minister, but for 
different reasons.  
 Such was the strength of opposition in the parliament that at the end of March the 
entire government resigned. The prime minister was duly reappointed along with a new 
cabinet in May, but again they were immediately faced with fresh interpellations from the 
parliament. On this occasion, though, the government was able to secure a majority in 
parliament to defer the questioning for a year, thus avoiding any immediate stalemate. It was 
nonetheless widely recognized that such a situation could not be maintained indefinitely; it 
was described by one local diplomat as the desperate tactics of a stalling government. 
                                                          
2
 Where quotations and comments are not referenced, these are drawn from interviews in each of the three 
countries by the author between 2010 and 2012. 
3
 The Bidoon have been a part of Kuwait since independence, when this third of the population were considered 
to be ‘without nationality’. They were thus not naturalized as Kuwaiti citizens and still lack basic citizenship 
rights, meaning they frequently struggle to get access to education and employment. Campaigns for access to 
those rights formed the basis of protests during several months in 2011. 
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 Those tactics came to a rather abrupt end in the autumn, particularly following the 
storming of parliament by protestors in November 2011. The unprecedented invasion of 
parliament, which appears to have been orchestrated by some members of the opposition, 
focused on alleged corruption by the prime minister, foreign minister and members of 
parliament. Most saliently for the parliament, the corruption scandal revolved around the 
depositing of around 25 million dinars into the bank accounts of pro-government MPs. 
Although many international media reports suggested that this was evidence of a sudden Arab 
Spring in Kuwait, it was in many ways simply a reflection of much longer-standing practices. 
Many local commentators reflected on the fact that the practice of buying MPs’ votes was 
universally known and an accepted part of Kuwait’s politics. But the impact of events 
elsewhere in the region during 2011, and the scale of the sums involved, appear to have acted 
as a catalyst for both media coverage and public outrage. 
 The immediate effect was another dissolution and fresh elections in February 2012. 
However, whereas previous elections were due to a stand-off between government and 
parliament, the fourth election in six years was a result of public dislike of both government 
and parliament. Again, opposition MPs did better than previously, and the election saw 
Islamists from both the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists increase their representation. More 
significantly, the parliament lifted the immunity of the accused MPs so that they could be 
prosecuted (most of them were no longer in parliament) and made another significant 
constitutional gain when, in March 2012, the new prime minister was questioned by 
parliament in public for the first time.  
2.4. Conclusion: back to the future – constitutional strength versus political weakness 
In contrast to the parliaments of Bahrain and Oman, the Majlis Al-Umma has been the key 
arena for political reform, and over fifty years won itself significant concessions. In recent 
years it has increasingly tested the government – as the successive resignations have shown – 
but these are occasional, short-term wins. Progress has been uneven and patchy, marked by 
periods of retrenchment and stasis. Perhaps more significantly, it does not appear that the 
periodic victories over the government have made the parliament more effective in holding 
government to account. If anything, those gains have come at the expense of public trust. The 
stand-offs between government and parliament, the all too frequent cycle of dissolution then 
elections followed by stalemate, have given the Kuwaiti public little sense of achievement. 
During 2011, the parliament seemed distant and removed from many of the public concerns, 
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and protest only served to emphasize the lack of public faith and concern at corruption within 
the Majlis Al-Umma.  
 By 2012 the parliament faced many of the same challenges it has always confronted. 
And these relate more to politics than to constitutional power. The corruption scandal simply 
highlighted the fact that the Al-Sabah’s approach to managed reform has depended to a large 
extent on their ability to manipulate the members of parliament. Because parliamentary 
elections do not necessarily provide the government with a natural majority, the regime has 
always sought to control the increasingly disparate elements within the institution, with 
varying degrees of success. The scandal has changed that dynamic, at least for the time being, 
as well as the complexion of parliament itself.  
 Yet the ability of government to manipulate parliament depends on the willingness of 
parliament itself to be manipulated. It is less clear whether the scandal will have longer-term 
implications for that manipulation, or indeed for the ability of parliament to provide 
constructive opposition to government. There are two dimensions to this. First is the highly 
personal nature of Kuwaiti politics. As several politicians and commentators told the author, 
all Kuwaiti politics is local. The selection and re-election of politicians depend to a large 
extent on their ability to meet the needs of key local figures, all of whom will expect certain 
services or benefits. This in turn means that the majority of MPs are susceptible to 
inducements offered in return for their vote. But it also means that politicians tend to be more 
concerned with the local rather than the national, and thus rarely band together to offer any 
alternative national vision to that of the government.  
 Second, although politicians tend to organize themselves in readily identifiable blocs, 
this is not the same as having formalized political parties. At the most obvious level, 
politicians stand for election as individuals rather than on a party platform, and the blocs lack 
the cohesion that is instilled by a common manifesto or programme. Therefore, within the 
institution they lack the organizational discipline that is central to parliamentary parties.  
 It is perhaps not surprising that one of the commonest suggestions to strengthen 
parliament from reforming politicians within Kuwait is the creation of meaningful political 
parties that contest elections. The argument increasingly heard is that political parties would 
mean that individual MPs would be less dependent on government patronage to provide local 
service or to ensure re-election, and that coherent parties would provide policy alternatives 
within parliament, and thus that it offered greater political resistance to government initiatives.  
 As it stands, however, the combination of political disorganization and parliament’s 
failure to offer an alternative national vision emphasizes its bigger problem, namely that it has 
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not clearly defined in the public mind what it is for. For as long as it continues to exist – and 
continues to cause the government problems – it offers the regime a semblance of democratic 
credibility. But it has not found a role that makes it indispensable to either government or the 
public. The government seems able to bypass or manipulate parliament at critical moments, 
and it is not clear to the vast majority of the public how their interests are being furthered 
within the institution. The dynamics of parliamentary politics reflect the tussle over power 
between the parliament and the ruling family, and the particular form of social compact that 
underpins Kuwait’s rentier state. It may be that Kuwait’s oil reserves and production capacity 
mean that it can continue to afford to meet its citizens’ expectation for longer than its 
neighbours, and to defer economic reform. However, it is likely that the future development of 
Kuwaiti politics will continue to be characterized by a bumpy testing of boundaries between 
the powers of the elected representatives and those of the Al-Sabah ruling family. 
3. BAHRAIN 
The movement for political reform in Bahrain started the twenty-first century with a degree of 
optimism about the country’s prospects for a change in the balance of power, with the 
accession of a new king and proposals to turn the kingdom into a constitutional monarchy in 
2000. By 2012, it was difficult to find anything but pessimism. Over the last forty years 
Bahrain has been far more politically turbulent than Kuwait, with tensions between the Shia 
population, who make up the majority of Bahrain’s citizens, and the Sunni regime, represented 
by the Al-Khalifa ruling family, spilling out into periods of civil unrest and subsequent state 
repression.  
 The Bahraini parliament has played an important symbolic role in those events. Its 
first, brief lifespan from 1973 to 1975 was followed by unconstitutional dissolution until 2002, 
when it was reinstated by the new king, partly as a way of defusing civil unrest, but with far 
less influence or power than its predecessor. Since then battles over the position of the 
parliament have become a focus for opposition groups demanding greater representation and 
accountability, while its election periods appeared to be providing a predictable cycle of 
increased state harassment and victimization of opponents. Over the course of the decade the 
parliament stumbled along, and although the main Shia party, Al-Wefaq, participated from 
2006, the institution was unable to offer much by way of meaningful opposition or vision.  
 The protests which formed part of the Arab Spring in early 2011, though, 
fundamentally changed the dynamics in the kingdom. The state’s reaction to the protests was 
violent and forceful and resulted in the resignation from the forty-member parliament of all 
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eighteen Al-Wefaq members. At the start of 2012, the parliament contained mainly loyalists, 
and its agenda reflected their interests, rather than those of the nation.  
3.1. The roots of protest: 1971–2002 
The impact of the Arab Spring on Bahrain, and the role of parliament in those events, have 
their roots in the recent history of the country. The Al-Khalifa family monopolized power in 
Bahrain until the country gained independence from Britain in 1971. In an effort to provide 
greater legitimacy for its rule, the family introduced a constitution in 1973, and held the first 
elections for the National Assembly in December of that year. The experience was, however, 
short-lived. Parliament’s challenging of government, and particularly its rejection of 
government proposals for summary powers to arrest those holding views considered to be a 
threat to the ‘security of the state’ in 1975, meant that the emir dissolved the body and 
suspended the constitution in August of that year. The suspension of the parliament was a 
defining point for many opponents of the regime. And, between 1994 and 1999, dissatisfaction 
with the political system combined with frustration over social and sectarian inequality, and 
specifically discrimination against the Shia majority, to create a prolonged period of violence 
and unrest in Bahrain. The government’s response was to detain demonstrators and exile 
opposition leaders, with suggestions of torture, intimidation and harassment rife (International 
Crisis Group 2005: 2–3).  
 The accession of Hamad bin ‘Isa Al-Khalifa in 1999 and his promise of reform 
defused many of these tensions. Within months he opened dialogue with opposition leaders, 
released detainees and allowed exiled Bahrainis to return. Politically, he suggested a return to 
the 1973 constitution and established special committees to develop reform proposals, 
published in December 2000. The resultant ‘National Action Charter’ stated that Bahrain 
should become a constitutional monarchy, with the powers of the king kept in check through a 
new bicameral legislature. The Majlis Al-Nuwab (Council of Representatives) would be 
directly elected, while the Majlis A’Shura (Consultative Council) would be appointed. The 
charter was, however, ‘uncomfortably vague’ on that process of appointment, and indeed on 
the relationship between the two chambers, causing some concern amongst leading reformers 
(Peterson 2009: 162). Nonetheless, the subsequent referendum on the constitutional changes 
in February 2001 resulted in overwhelming approval, with 98.4 per cent of Bahrainis voting in 
favour. 
 This, though, proved to be the high point of the reform process. The implementation of 
the constitution in February 2002 contained various amendments, inserted by the king, which 
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retained certain key powers for the ruler, including full control of the government and the right 
to dissolve parliament. Then, in July, the provisions for parliament were published, which 
clarified the relationship between to the two chambers of parliament, determining that the 
forty-person Nuwab would be complemented by a forty-person Shura – appointed by the king 
and able to include members of the ruling family. Critically, in the event of disagreement 
between the two houses, the Shura would have the casting vote. With limited ability to 
scrutinize ministers and initiate legislation the Nuwab would be a pale imitation of its 
predecessor. It was not the return to the 1973 constitution that the king had promised. The 
changes, and the manner in which they had been implemented, revived concern and distrust 
amongst reformers. The immediate effect was the decision by four key political groups to 
boycott the elections scheduled for October.  
3.2. Controlled pluralism – politics without parties: 2002–11 
After 2002, in contrast with the situation in Kuwait, the Al-Khalifa’s style of political 
management depended less on the direct manipulation of those within parliament than of the 
system as a whole. The limited powers granted to the parliament, and thus the constellation of 
forces within the institution, meant it simply posed less of a threat to the rulers. Like Kuwait, 
Bahrain has no formal political parties, but again de facto parties exist as ‘political societies’. 
The main societies tend to be Islamist movements, of both Shia and Sunni origin, but less 
ideologically driven than counterparts elsewhere, and they have shown an ability to work with 
each other, especially on the need for greater political reform. The four societies that 
boycotted the elections were the predominantly Shia Islamist groups Al-Wefaq and Islamic 
Action Society, along with the liberal secular National Democratic Society and the secular 
Progressive National Bloc.  
 As a result, the most significant debates in the subsequent parliament between 2002 
and 2006 mainly pitted the Sunni Islamist groups against each other. They offered little 
substantial opposition to government, and although the parliament did in that period push for 
greater powers, it had limited results. Rather, it was the activities of groups outside parliament 
that set the tone for the subsequent election in 2006. During that period Shia and Sunni 
political societies pressed for a return to the 1973 constitution, an increase in parliamentary 
power and a reduction in the influence of the Shura. But it was the government’s adoption of a 
political parties law in 2005 which provided the biggest catalyst. The law was designed to 
restrict further political activities and meant that political societies had to register or be 
deemed illegal. In the event, the biggest Shia society, Al-Wefaq, decided to register and 
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contest the subsequent elections in 2006. (A more hardline splinter group, Al-Haq, broke away 
from Al-Wefaq at this point and remains formally outside the law.) 
 Unsurprisingly, turnout in 2006 was markedly higher, at 72 per cent (compared with 
53 per cent in 2002), and the Shia Islamists did relatively well, picking up seventeen of the 
forty seats, plus backing one secular independent Sunni MP. (They repeated this feat in the 
elections of 2010, again winning eighteen seats, although these were all taken by Al-Wefaq 
members.) The balance of forces in parliament changed its dynamic after 2006. The simple 
fact that the parliament now included significant Shia representation meant a more obvious 
diversity of opinion was articulated and immediately made the institution more lively. Many 
of the issues, particularly in the early stages of the 2006 parliament, divided along sectarian 
lines, with Al-Wefaq attempting to redress discrimination against the Shia population in 
various areas of the economy, employment opportunities and social entitlements. However, 
their frustration at Sunni opposition and the limited opportunities to influence policy meant 
they occasionally resorted to walking out of the chamber in order to make the plenary 
inquorate, and prevent decisions taking place.  
 Numerous commentators bemoaned the fact that the parties tended to play only to their 
own constituencies and thus were limited in impact. But towards the end of the parliament, the 
blocs were occasionally working in conjunction with each other. Parliamentary investigations 
into contentious issues such as corruption within Gulf Air (the national airline), the selling of 
land titles and parliamentary oversight of the national budget saw instances of relatively 
successful cross-party collaboration. Although one local analyst described the quality of the 
debate as often not getting beyond ‘primary school level’, it suggested a basis from which the 
institution could develop its influence.  
 Despite these small, positive signs, the Bahraini parliament was unable to test the 
government in a similar fashion to that in Kuwait. Whereas the Kuwaiti parliament was at the 
forefront of the debate about the constitutional balance of powers, the Bahraini parliament was 
more marginal. Although politicians argued for greater parliamentary power, their ability to 
force any issue was much more constrained. And the fact that parliament had struggled to 
challenge the authority of government meant that the Al-Khalifa style of controlled pluralism 
up to 2011 was less focused on parliament itself, but characterized by electoral manipulation, 
harassment of opponents and repression of civil society.  
 First, the gerrymandering of electoral constituencies to ensure Sunni domination of the 
parliament has been one of the most contentious issues since the 2006 election. Although Shia 
citizens account for more than two-thirds of the population, they won less than 50 per cent of 
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the seats in 2006 and 2010. This was a direct result of the way in which the constituencies are 
drawn, with the forty electoral districts varying greatly in size: the largest district contains 
over 12,000 people, in a mainly Shia area, and the smallest – largely Sunni – has only 500 
voters (Bertelsmann Stiftung,2009). In addition, the government has sought to expand the 
Sunni population by granting citizenship to expatriates from Jordan, Yemen, Iraq, Syria and 
Saudi Arabia. The size of this exercise was revealed in the 2008 census results, which 
suggested that the number of Bahraini citizens had increased by 42 per cent (Lawson 2010: 5), 
and Shia opposition groups claim that between 65,000 and 100,000 additional Sunnis were 
added to the electoral rolls between 2000 and 2010 (Cambanis 2010). 
 Second, harassment of opposition candidates and supporters was a significant feature 
of both the 2006 and 2010 election campaigns. Government tactics gained particular 
prominence just before the election in 2006 when a report compiled by a former adviser to the 
Ministry for Cabinet Affairs, Salah al-Bandar, was released suggesting a concerted effort by 
government to rig the voting system. It claimed that the government had spent around US$6 
million to fund anti-Shia, and specifically Al-Wefaq, campaigning. Reports of vote-buying, 
intimidation of voters and destruction of campaign offices were common in both 2006 and 
2010, with opponents arrested, their houses fire-bombed and detainees allegedly tortured by 
the authorities (Economist 2010). 
 Third, although Bahrain has a more lively civil society than other countries in the Gulf, 
the government has sought to place strict limits on that activity – particularly those that seek to 
monitor government. Most visibly, the security services have gone after various human rights 
groups in Bahrain, and in 2004 abolished a human rights organization after a string of critical 
reports. In addition, journalists critical of government are frequently arrested and operate 
within tightly defined laws. But international democracy promotion organizations have also 
been prevented from operating in Bahrain. The US National Democratic Institute (NDI) had 
its licence revoked in the run-up to the 2006 elections, and although it was able to operate 
from 2007 onwards, it was again effectively thrown out shortly before the 2010 poll. 
According to another Bahrain-based human rights organization, the NDI’s eviction was due to 
the authorities’ fear that the NDI would want to monitor the conduct of the next election, and 
were training local Bahrainis how to do so (Bahrain Center for Human Rights 2010). 
 By the end of 2010 it appeared that Bahrain-style managed reform would involve a 
cycle of increased state repression during election campaigns in order to quell dissent, limit 
the development of political society and divert any international criticism of the electoral 
system. In between elections, for as long as the parliament posed no serious challenge to 
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government, the regime appeared to be loosening their control, while there was less at stake. 
This dynamic was obviously shattered during 2011. 
3.3. Civil unrest and the end of limited pluralism: 2011 
On 14 February 2011, activists staged a ‘day of rage’ in Manama, which focused principally 
on the need for political and democratic reforms. However, the security forces’ response, in 
which seven people died over the first four days, entrenched and radicalized the protests. 
Although the demonstrations were not specifically sectarian, the bulk of the protesters were 
Shia and the demands expanded from the call for democratic change and human rights to 
reflect a range of socio-economic grievances – not least the institutionalized discrimination 
against the Shia majority.  
 In the month following it appeared that dialogue was possible, with the crown prince, 
Salman bin Hamad bin Al-Khalifa, leading discussions on behalf of the government with the 
opposition forces. For their part the opposition leaders seemed willing to negotiate, but listed 
various demands including the abolition of the 2002 constitution, reform of the electoral 
system and the resignation of the government. On 13 March, the crown prince stated the 
regime’s willingness to compromise in certain key areas, including a parliament with 
significant powers and fairly drawn electoral constituencies. However, the position of the 
prime minister – in power for forty-one years, he reportedly enjoys significant personal 
support from Saudi Arabia and took a far harder line on the opposition forces than did the 
crown prince and the king – was one of the key issues that could not be resolved. Only a day 
after the crown prince’s statement Saudi Arabia sent 1,000 troops to Bahrain, joined by around 
500 from the United Aram Emirates to provide support whilst the Bahraini Defence Force 
violently crushed the protests.  
 Parliament’s formal role in these developments was tangential. The members of Al-
Wefaq stopped participating in parliament days after the initial crackdown in February, and by 
May all eighteen members had resigned formally from parliament. In July Al-Wefaq also 
withdrew from the National Dialogue Initiative. The content and tone of debate within 
parliament reflected its reduced composition, and although there were attempts to question 
ministers these were at best half-hearted. By-elections to replace the missing Wefaqis took 
place in September and the new parliament reconvened in October. Although the parliament 
then contained eight independent Shia MPs they were, according to one local activist, ‘mostly 
well-meaning’ but shying away from anything that might be deemed confrontational. 
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 The parliament has remained marginal, failing to address the key political issues. 
There was, for example, little discussion of the Manama Document, published in October 
2011 by the main opposition groups, recommending wide-ranging constitutional and political 
reform. And, according to local observers, parliament failed to debate and respond to the key 
legislative recommendations of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, preferring to 
criticize its chair, M. Cherif Bassiouni, for his approach rather than the substance of his report. 
Although there was much coverage of the additional powers given to parliament in the spring 
of 2012, which increase parliament’s ability to question ministers, withdraw confidence in 
government and reject its action plan, these have been widely dismissed as inadequate and 
inconsequential. One former Al-Wefaq MP commented that the reforms had singularly failed 
to impress either the opposition, the public or international diplomats based in Bahrain. 
 The events of 2011 brought to a head the dilemma that had absorbed Al-Wefaq since 
the first elections in 2002: do they participate in parliament, but run the risk of being co-opted, 
providing legitimacy to a system which offers little influence? Or do they decide to operate 
entirely as an external opponent attempting to force change from the outside, but give up any 
opportunity to shape the formal political process? Their experience of boycotting the first set 
of elections suggested that they were likely to have more influence, and enjoy a legitimate 
public platform for their policies, by working in parliament. But the expectation of many of 
their voters is that they should have delivered far more, a view which undermines public 
support not only for the party (often attracted to outside organizations such as Al-Haq) but for 
the parliament as well. Prior to the 2010 election, the bulk of the party’s politicians felt that 
their long-term future lay within the parliamentary system. The events of 2011 effectively 
took the decision out of their hands, and through publications such as the Manama Document, 
they are pushing for major constitutional change outside parliament. The line from Al-Wefaq 
is now that unless the parliament is given significantly more powers, as part of a wider 
programme of political reform, there seems little chance that the party will opt in once again. 
But, according to a local analyst, the party was less harmonious than it had ever been. 
Although it nominally still supports a constitutional monarchy, the longer it remains outside 
with little impact on the system, the greater get the chances of its fragmenting as calls for 
more radical reform gain traction (Louër 2012). 
3.4. Conclusion: limited pluralism and targeted repression 
The fact that Bahrain has a majority Shia population and a minority Sunni regime would 
suggest that it arguably had more need for a democratic parliament to legitimize that rule than 
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did other states in the region. In fact, the regime’s approach has been cruder and more violent, 
which may hold in the short term, but does not appear to be a realistic long-term strategy. 
Unlike Kuwait, Bahrain does not have the oil wealth with which to buy off dissent. Rather, it 
is heavily dependent on Saudi Arabia, which supplies Bahrain with 140,000 barrels of oil per 
day (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009: 19). That Saudi Arabian influence is particularly nervous of 
Shia domination in Bahrain as it claims it would bolster Iran’s position in the region, and 
potentially inspire its own Shia population in its Eastern Province. 
 The way in which the Bahraini style of managed reform has evolved, however, 
provides a parallel with Kuwait, in that both highlight divisions within the ruling family. 
Opinion is still divided over King Hamad’s true motives for constitutional change when he 
acceded to power. One argument is that he is a genuine reformer but was blown off course 
early by having to manage other powerful and conservative interests within the ruling family. 
More recent interpretations put the king and crown prince on the side of reform and 
negotiation with the protestors, and the prime minister and a coterie of ministers against, 
supported by allies in Saudi Arabia. 
 Either way, the purpose of the constitutional changes and the re-creation of the 
parliament at the start of the century was partly to dissipate some of the lingering tensions 
between the Shia and Sunni populations, and partly to secure greater legitimacy for Al-Khalifa 
rule. However, Bahrain provides a telling dimension to Huntington’s ‘King’s Dilemma’, in 
that the creation of the parliament, while the ruling family retains monarchical power, has 
arguably emphasized and accentuated the original problems it was designed to address. That 
is, after the turmoil of the 1990s the promise of political reform did much to ease sectarian 
tension between the Shia and Sunni populations. But those expectations were undermined 
swiftly by the way in which the parliament’s powers were restricted. The performance of the 
parliament since 2002 has reinforced the public perception that it is a toothless and ineffective 
body. It has not played the same role as the parliament in Kuwait, as the key forum within 
which political concessions might be won, and it has delivered few tangible benefits for the 
majority Shia population.  
 Instead, the parliament provided a public arena in which the division of interests 
between Shia and Sunni populations could be aired – but not resolved. Parliamentary debates 
not only stressed that division in the public mind, but also continued to highlight the way in 
which the Shia population is discriminated against, and emphasized the limited ability of the 
parliament to redress these grievances. According to many local commentators, far from 
easing sectarian tension, the parliament has made it more apparent.  
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 In short, the Al-Khalifa style of managed reform may have worked in the short term, 
but offers little hope for the long term. It has exacerbated rather than softened the divisions 
within Bahrain. The violent reaction to the protests in Manama has further undermined the 
sense that parliament can offer any meaningful opposition to government, and meant that the 
main opposition now exists outside parliament. In terms of political management, this makes 
it more difficult to negotiate, compromise and co-opt opposition leaders, as there appears to be 
increasingly little that the rulers can offer them, short of wide-ranging constitutional reform or 
continued repression.  
 Bahrain’s parliament will, though, continue to exist in some form, with or without Shia 
members. Diplomats based in Manama stress the international strategic significance of 
Bahrain in the region, and the need for it to have at least a semblance of democracy. The need 
to diversify its economy and its desire to become a business hub, as well as international 
pressure, they suggest, means the Al-Khalifa family is unlikely to dissolve the parliament 
entirely. But without significant reforms and the return of the main Shia political parties the 
existence of the parliament is likely to make very little difference to the lives of most 
Bahrainis. 
4. OMAN  
By comparison with those in Kuwait and Bahrain, the process of political liberalization in 
Oman has proceeded in a slow, quiet and linear fashion and this has been reflected in the way 
it has dealt with the recent events. The directly elected Majlis A’Shura has not played the 
same symbolic role as in Kuwait and Bahrain, but has slowly accreted power to itself since the 
first universal elections in 2003. It is an exercise in extreme top-down reform whose pace is 
determined almost entirely by the ruling Sultan Qaboos, who, until 2011, faced little domestic 
or international pressure for change. In comparison with Bahrain, the unrest was relatively 
minor, but in a country characterized by consensus and placidity under Qaboos, it had a 
significant effect, resulting in both an economic and a political response. The sultan’s initial 
promises of additional powers to the legislature in the spring of 2011 have been partially 
realized, but perhaps more significantly, since the elections of 2011 the parliament now 
appears both more assertive and more accountable to the public. Although the institution still 
lacks many basic powers, the way in which it has developed recently suggests that it is likely 
to continue evolving along the same lines, and may play a greater role within Oman’s political 
development 
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 The dynamics of change in Oman need to be understood in relation to two distinct 
features. The first is the sultan himself. Qaboos came to power in 1970 when he overthrew his 
father, having been under virtual house arrest since the mid-1960s, seizing power with the 
tacit support of the British government. However, the accession was contested by his uncle 
Sayid Tariq bin Taymur, who wanted to establish Oman as a constitutional monarchy, while 
Qaboos wanted untrammelled monarchical power. Although Tariq was made prime minister, 
he had resigned by the end of 1971, and central authority as well as the legitimacy of the state 
were concentrated in the person of the sultan (Valeri 2006: 187). Although he was widely 
regarded as a benign ruler, there could be no doubt that the state was to be run as an autocracy. 
The Basic Law (effectively the constitution) established in 1996 enshrined leadership in the 
sultan and stated that public activities remained ‘the prerogative of the state’ (Siegfried 2000: 
372).  
 Second, the political culture is infected at every level with the ‘Omani way’, which, 
broadly, means that any change is consistent with Omani culture and tradition (Jones and 
Ridout 2005; Rabi 2002). On its own this means that reforms proceed slowly, but that pace is 
further tempered by the overarching emphasis on consultation and consensus. It is not a 
coincidence that Oman’s principal representative body is the Majlis A’Shura (Consultative 
Council), rather than the Majlis Al-Umma (People’s Council) in Kuwait or the Majlis Al- 
Nuwab (Council of Representatives) favoured in Bahrain. Ultimately, the legitimacy of the 
institutions comes ‘not only from the principle of representation but also from consultation, 
which, in Oman, also functions as principle, or an end in itself’ (Jones 2007: 169). 
 The first steps towards representation took place in 1991 when the Majlis A’Shura was 
formed, with representatives of fifty-nine constituencies (wilayah) chosen by notables in each 
of those areas. Although it had very limited powers, ministers would be obliged to report to 
the Shura on their activity. The electorate was gradually expanded over the course of the next 
decade until 2003, when the first full elections were held under universal franchise. By the 
2007 elections the Shura had eight-four members, who competed on the basis of names only, 
but were for the first time able to employ campaign techniques such as posters and 
advertisements. The Shura was complemented by the creation of the Majlis A’Dawla in 2000, 
as an upper, appointed body, a move which was widely welcomed. 
 The powers of the Shura were, however, effectively limited to economic matters. It 
could not initiate legislation, it had limited ability to comment on government bills and the key 
offices of state – which reside with the sultan – such as defence and foreign affairs remained 
beyond the purview of the institution. The turnout for elections has been relatively poor, at 
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around 30 per cent, perhaps because, in the words of one author, the Shura resembles ‘a 
depoliticised local council’ (Rabi 2009: 216). The limitations on the Shura’s powers, 
combined with the continuing absence of political parties, means that elections are relatively 
meaningless, offering citizens only a choice between local dignitaries rather than competing 
visions of government.  
 The problems of the Majlis reflect the context within which it operates. Conversations 
with individuals in civil society, the media and the State Council identified three themes. First, 
the personification of the state in the form of the sultan himself makes any sort of opposition 
difficult, because it is not possible to distinguish between opposing the government and 
opposing the state, or the sultan as well. Second, the Majlis shares this desire for public 
consensus and what one activist described as‘unhealthy displays of unity’. The five-year 
national plans which have characterized Oman’s development under Qaboos were simply 
‘forty pages of everything is going OK’. Omanis in and around the Majlis argued that 
members give ministers a hard time in private, but it is the emphasis on consensus that the 
public sees. This means that, third, the public has very little understanding of what the Majlis 
does, as there are few public or visible indications of its work or impact. Between 2007 and 
2010 the Majlis thus became an easy target for derision, particularly from key cabinet 
ministers seeking to undermine its influence further – with many arguing that the institution 
was stronger when its membership was appointed, because it meant the quality of members 
was higher.  
4.1. Unrest and incremental change: 2011 
Under Sultan Qaboos, Oman’s political development appears remarkably limited, especially 
by comparison with Bahrain and Kuwait. However, understanding the events of 2011 and the 
sultan’s response to them means putting that process of change into context. First, all Omani 
politics revolves around the issue of succession to the sultan because he has no named heir, 
and it remains unclear who will take his place. Although there is a process in place, involving 
the ruling family’s attempts to agree an appointment, the fallback is that the sultan has named 
a successor whose identity is contained in two envelopes held securely in different parts of the 
country. Unsurprisingly, there is a huge amount of uncertainty and speculation about what will 
happen when the sultan dies, but very little public discussion of the possible implications. 
 It is perhaps the danger of a political vacuum that has prompted some of the reforms. It 
is significant, as mentioned, that the moves towards greater representation before 2011 came 
from the sultan himself, who faced no obvious public pressure for such moves. According to 
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Kechichian (2006) it was a recognition that emancipation would need to come at some stage, 
that it would not happen quickly, and that it was better controlled by the sultan, but ‘that once 
such a step was initiated, it would be impossible to set the process back’ (2006: 51). Progress 
may have been slow, but this controlled evolution has not been marked by the sorts of 
regressive and repressive steps taken in Kuwait and Bahrain. 
 The need for change may also reflect both demographic and economic imperatives. 
Oman has one of the highest rates of population growth in the world, estimated at around 3.5 
per cent a year. This presents an economic challenge to the rentier model. Although oil is still 
the mainstay of its economy, accounting for around half of the country’s GDP, its natural 
resources are far lower than those of its neighbours and the country has gone further in 
privatizing and diversifying the economy (Ahmad 2008). But it is estimated that the number 
entering the job market each year will increase by 212 per cent by 2035, and that the economy 
will need to find 700,000 new jobs in that period (Kechichian 2006: 87). With structural 
unemployment estimated at somewhere between 12 per cent and 15 per cent, economic 
performance is likely to have a strong bearing on the politics of Oman in coming years. 
 The by-product of that population growth is not only that Oman has a very young 
population, but that there is an emerging generational divide. For those who remember the 
sultan’s accession, his rule has brought peace and stability to a land that was wracked by 
bloody wars. However, for anyone under the age of forty whose aspirations for Oman go 
beyond the absence of war, this history is increasingly irrelevant. Rather, it presents a 
challenge on the political front as the political expectations of this younger generation, 
particularly those educated in the West, may outstrip the speed of reform in Oman (Rabi 2009: 
217). By the end of 2010 this generational difference was increasingly evident not just in civil 
society, but even within the Majlis and the cabinet. 
 The unrest that emerged in the early part of 2011 reflected a number of these trends. 
Although deadly violence broke out in Sohar, other demonstrations were mostly peaceful and 
their principal driver was economic rather than political, particularly to do with employment 
and standards of living. In response the sultan raised the minimum wage, promised to create 
50,000 new jobs and set up employment benefit for job seekers. 
 It was also significant that, unlike in other countries, the sultan was not the target of 
the demonstrations. Although the protesters’ complaints went on to include the level of 
corruption, they were less overtly political than in Bahrain or elsewhere. Yet the sultan’s 
political response was marked – he swiftly removed twelve ministers and drew new ministers 
from the Majlis itself, to create a cabinet that was, in the words of one commentator, ‘far more 
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representative of Oman than its predecessor’. In total the sultan issued around forty royal 
decrees instituting political reforms, including making key public bodies accountable and 
granting new powers to the state audit body. Perhaps more importantly, the sultan announced 
that the role and powers of the Majlis would be changed. Establishing a committee to examine 
the reform of the Majlis, the sultan indicated that the body would be given legislative powers 
for the first time and that members of the cabinet would be drawn from amongst its members.  
 In typically Omani fashion, progress since has been slow, but significant nonetheless. 
The Shura has been granted new powers on issues related to auditing and votes of confidence, 
but still lacks the power to initiate legislation. However, the more significant changes are less 
to do with the institution’s formal powers than with the way in which its members are seeking 
to use those powers, and the way it is perceived by the public.  
 Public and political interest in the Shura seemed markedly higher in the run-up to the 
elections in October 2011. Following the announcement of new legislative powers, the sultan 
reopened the lists for candidates, and reports suggested that in Mattra, for instance, the number 
of candidates went up from 5 to 35, while in Seeb they increased from 40 to around 100. In 
total, 1,330 candidates registered, a 70 per cent increase on the 2007 poll, and turnout was 
recorded at around 76 per cent (Katzman 2012c: 5).  
 This public interest has further shaped the way in which the Shura has operated 
subsequently, with a far greater emphasis on openness and transparency. In an unprecedented 
move, it established its own YouTube channel in 2012, and television broadcasts of 
parliamentary sessions have increased citizen interest in its deliberations. In turn, members 
appear to be staking their claim as defenders of the public interest, and according to local 
analysts the institution has much greater concern for public accountability.  
 This, in turn, appears to be changing the way the Shura engages with government. The 
royal decree of 2011 outlined some of the details of Majlis reform, including powers to amend 
draft laws and budgets as well as the ability to elect its own chair, but one former 
parliamentary staff member sees genuine progress made not so much in terms of powers 
granted, but in the way existing powers are being used under heightened popular scrutiny. The 
Shura appears to be increasingly assertive in its questioning of ministers – perhaps indicative 
of this is a recent terminological shift that describes the appearance of a minister before the 
Majlis as an istijwab (questioning) rather than a munaqasha (conversation). Such a 
development hardly registers on the regional political scale, especially given the seismic 
events occurring elsewhere in the Gulf, but the growing assertiveness of the Shura has led 
some to speak of a ‘cold war’ between it and the government. In short, membership of the 
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Shura suddenly appears to be more attractive, potentially offering a route to political influence 
that had not previously existed. Partly as a result, the Shura is enjoying greater influence as an 
institution within Oman. 
4.2. Conclusion: political management and the promise of reform 
It is far too early to judge whether the Majlis A’Shura is on its way to becoming more like a 
parliament; however, the trajectory of that political change and the factors that are driving it 
make Oman a particularly interesting country within the region. Unlike in other MENA 
countries, demands for reform are principally about the livelihood and economic position of 
Omanis – especially in relation to the large imported workforce. The social and economic 
catalysts that exist are not of the same order as those that have characterized the protests 
elsewhere, Oman does not have the sort of sectarian divisions that wrack Bahrain and it has 
more successfully diversified its economy than a country like Kuwait. It undoubtedly suffers 
some of the problems of the traditional rentier state, but there have been few specific demands 
for political reform, as in other countries. Although there are undoubtedly those who feel 
strongly that the pace of political change needs to quicken, it is not clear how widely this view 
is shared. As such, the sultan’s swift and, by Omani standards, radical response has given 
many local activists grounds for cautious optimism. 
 Yet the sultan’s management of political tensions is often more subtle than widely 
recognized. Towards the end of 2010 – around the time that the sultan’s forty years in power 
were being celebrated with numerous national holidays – discussions with local NGOs, 
politicians and journalists suggested that it was widely recognized that the cabinet contained 
two factions manoeuvring for power to succeed the sultan. The political changes allowed the 
sultan to reshape the cabinet entirely and remove those ministers vying for power. At the same 
time, although the sultan himself is widely regarded as a benign and popular ruler, by acting 
decisively he has diverted any potential criticism and shown himself responsive to public 
concern. In some ways, he has again positioned himself above the political fray. 
 Given that context, the Shura has not played the same pivotal role in Omani politics as 
its counterparts have in Kuwait and Bahrain, either in pushing for constitutional change, or in 
being regarded as symbolic of the struggle for political reform. As such, the style of managed 
reform has been markedly different in Oman: a process of slow, incremental but nonetheless 
linear progress, driven from above. Oman appears to be facing a generational change which 
may alter that dynamic in the coming years, and it seems that the activity of the Majlis 
A’Shura may be reflecting some of that change. If anything the members of the institution 
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seem more eager and willing to use the powers at their disposal than their counterparts, for the 
first time drawing strength from and utilizing the public interest in their work. 
 It may be that the Majlis could develop a significant role, and could still play a pivotal 
part in managing the succession of the ruler. It may also be that the ongoing political reforms 
might, at some point, mean the creation of a prime ministerial post for the first time. Yet few 
are willing to speculate. The process of managed reform in Oman ultimately depends on the 
sultan himself, who, despite the reforms, appears to enjoy as much control over the process as 
he has ever done. 
5. CONCLUSION: PARLIAMENTARY ORGANIZATION AND THE USE OF POLITICAL POWER 
Until the events of 2011, analysis of Middle East politics tended to focus on the notion of 
‘Arab exceptionalism’, but often with an underlying assumption that democratization is, 
ultimately, inevitable (Anderson 2006: 209). Several authors have compared the political 
development of some GCC countries to the evolution of Europe’s nation states into 
constitutional monarchies (e.g. Herb 2009b: 134–5), suggesting, implicitly, that the countries 
will sooner or later develop broader forms of representative democracy. Although recent 
events suggest that the political balance might be slowly shifting, political liberalization in the 
Gulf remains a process of top-down, managed reform which preserves the power and position 
of the autocrats who rule these countries.  
 The three parliaments examined in this paper have played important but distinct roles 
in each of the countries, and the events of the Arab Spring presented a stress test for both the 
rulers’ styles of political management and the parliamentary institutions themselves. They all 
responded differently. In Kuwait, the Al-Sabah family had used the parliament as a forum for 
managing demands for greater constitutional power, as members pushed for the rights to 
question ministers and challenge government. That process of management has frequently 
resulted in stalemate, with both sides able to claim small victories. But the process has often 
been destructive and, in the long term, may simply be undermining the public’s faith in the 
institution’s ability to achieve anything meaningful. 
 In Bahrain, the Al-Khalifa family’s response to the protests in early 2011 effectively 
destroyed any sense that the parliament could play any meaningful role in the kingdom. Given 
that the parliament was created as part of their political strategy in 2002, in part to manage 
tensions between Sunni and Shia populations, it singularly failed to do so. As mentioned, the 
Majlis Al-Nuwab provided a forum for airing the tensions between the two communities but 
offered no ways of resolving them. The continuation of the parliament without any Al-Wefaq 
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representation only serves to highlight the failure of the rulers’ approach to managed reform – 
they now have no one to negotiate with, and are almost entirely dependent on repression to 
secure their authority.  
 In Oman, the Majlis A’Shura has never had the same symbolic value as the 
parliaments in Kuwait and Bahrain, but the country has never faced the same political drivers 
for change or sectarian tensions. As a result, the institution has not been the forum within 
which the sultan has sought to manage those pressures. Rather the Shura appears a secondary 
mechanism by which the ruler can highlight his commitment to consultation with the people. 
But since early 2011 its efforts at public accountability and assertiveness with government 
suggest that it is more sensitive to the interests of its voters than either of the other 
parliaments. It still remains weak, and often tangential, and the change is slow, but it is 
nonetheless significant. 
 The events of the Arab Spring seemed to emphasize the distance between these 
institutions and what was happening outside. The subsequent paths were determined almost 
entirely by local and national issues rather than ideologically driven movements for 
democracy. The fundamental question is how well suited these institutions are to such a 
challenge, should it arise. The experience in other parts of the MENA region is that the 
parliaments which helped to prop up the previous regime needed to be radically reformed to 
secure any sort of legitimacy. How far these institutions can play that role is likely to depend 
on their ability not just to respond to public concerns, but to find ways of providing and 
delivering alternatives to the government. So far, where they have been effective, their 
victories have tended to be short-lived, tactical wins, creating a nuisance for the government 
but not really offering any sort of genuine oversight or accountability. In all three countries, 
the process of reform is still being controlled by the regimes, and the future of the parliaments 
in each remains uncertain.  
 Generally speaking, there are three key challenges which the parliaments need to 
overcome, if they are to be more effective. First, across the Arab world the concept of a ‘loyal 
opposition’ that sits at the core of many parliamentary systems is poorly developed. It is still 
difficult for opposition groups to claim that they support the state but oppose the policies of 
the government, when the prime minister, the ruling family and the state are synonymous in 
the public mind. Opposition groups have to go out of their way to make that distinction clear, 
but often find the nuance is lost in public debate. This, of course, benefits the ruling regimes, 
who are then able to demonize any opposition as enemies of the state. 
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 Second, in each of these states the parliament is weakened by the limited nature of 
political society. Although each of the regimes has sought to limit the power of the 
parliamentary institutions, the formal power of the parliament is arguably not as important as 
the way in which that power is used by politicians. As Kuwait shows, a parliament can wrest 
what look like significant powers from the government only to find that MPs are unwilling or 
unable to use them to call the government to account. The government’s ability to manipulate 
the institutions is most obviously enhanced by the lack of political parties, meaning that even 
where parliamentary blocs exist, they lack the discipline and cohesion to organize the 
parliament effectively. When MPs are dependent solely on local opinion for their re-election, 
rather than on a party platform, they can be far more easily manipulated by government. As 
Brumberg notes, the survival strategies for autocratic rulers are designed to prevent the 
emergence of any effective political society (Brumberg 2002: 64), allowing them to split the 
opposition and undermine the effectiveness of the parliamentary institution as a whole. But, 
by the same token, opposition movements ‘have not proven themselves able to capitalise on 
the regimes’ need to burnish their democratic credentials to wrest concessions or enlarge the 
political space within which they are allowed to operate’ (Ottaway and Hamzawy 2009: 11). 
 Third, in turn, this further weakens the claims of the parliament and the political blocs 
to political and public legitimacy. All of the parliaments are struggling to find a distinctive 
role within their respective political systems. At present they have neither entirely convinced 
the public of the benefits that they bring nor created a role in the administration of the state 
which gives them a unique and clear authority. In short, they have not made themselves 
indispensable to rulers or ruled. That said, it is difficult to imagine any of those parliamentary 
institutions being abolished entirely. They were established to provide new sources of 
legitimacy for the regime and outlets for public concern, and although that legitimizing role is 
somewhat attenuated (particularly in Bahrain), without them those rulers would face increased 
difficulties in governing and managing internal tensions.  
 As Ghassan Salame suggested in 1994, political liberalization is not so much the result 
of struggle for democracy as the end product of complex social phenomena (Salame 1994: 
16). Political change in the Gulf region and across the Arab world in the coming years will be 
determined not so much by arguments about forms of governance as by questions of identity, 
religious and ethnic politics, economic development and the dynamics of the rentier state 
(Anderson 2006: 209). The role of parliaments in each of these countries will depend less on 
their ability to secure more formal power for themselves than on the way they use those 
powers – and the role they play in shaping each of those key debates.  
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